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Appropriating Dewey
Hu Shi and His Translation of Dewey’s “Social and Political Philosophy”
Lecture Series in China
Yung-chen Chiang
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I would like to thank Mac Dixon-Fyle, my colleague at the History Department at DePauw
University, for his keen comments on the paper.
1 John and Alice Dewey’s visit to Japan in 1919 and their subsequent sojourn in China from
1919 to 1921 are  well  documented and celebrated.  Their  Letters  from China  and Japan
published in 1920 and his  articles  published in the New Republic and Asia and,  later,
reprinted in Characters and Events in 1929, contained many pithy observations and incisive
analyses of China and Japan that remain useful to historians even today. Yet while his
lectures  at  the  Imperial  University  of  Tokyo  were  published  as  The  Reconstruction  in
Philosophy, his China lectures were unfortunately lost. In 1973, the University Press of
Hawaii  published  John  Dewey:  Lectures  in  China,  1919-1920, which  used  the  Chinese
transcripts of Dewey’s lectures and translated them back into English.
2 Until recently, whether John Dewey: Lectures in China, 1919-1920 can be admitted into the
Dewey œuvre has been a moot point. The discovery that I made in the Hu Shi (Hu Shih)
Archives in Beijing of Dewey’s most important China lecture series notes, “Social and
Political Philosophy,” changed the situation.1 Hu Shi translated all of Dewey’s lectures in
Beijing and in the provinces of Shandong and Shanxi. Now, with three texts available to
us – these newly-discovered Dewey’s lectures notes, Hu Shi’s Chinese translation of them,
and the  University  Press  of  Hawaii’s  translation  of  Hu’s  Chinese  translation  back  to
English – we have a unique opportunity to conduct a translation case study in three
directions: first, to check Hu Shi’s translation against Dewey’s lecture notes; and second,
to check John Dewey: Lectures in China, 1919-1920, “back translations” in the terminology of
translation studies, both against Hu’s translation and against Dewey’s original notes that
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the back translators tried to reconstruct. More important, by treating translations as re-
writes and as products of cultural and ideological manipulations,2 this case study enables
us to analyze how Hu Shi appropriated Dewey’s ideas to advance his own cultural and
political agenda while acting as the latter’s interpreter.
3 Dewey’s “Social and Political Philosophy” lecture series consisted of sixteen lectures that
he delivered at Peking University once a week on Saturday afternoons from 4 P.M. to 6
P.M. beginning on September 20, 1919. His lecture notes that are extant in the Hu Shi
Archives consist of Lectures I, II, III, IV, X, XI, XII, and XVI, exactly half of this lecture
series.3 Dewey’s name does not appear on any of these notes. The words “Social Pol Phil
Lecture I” appear on the first page of the first lecture, with the page number typed on the
top middle of the page for this lecture. The rest of the extant lecture notes have “SPP”
typed on the top left margin, followed by a Roman numeral indicating the lecture number
in the series and then by a dash and an Arabic number indicating the page number of the
lecture. These notes are typed by Dewey himself using the typewriter that he brought
with him to Japan and China.
4 Hu explained the process of production in translating Dewey’s lectures in China forty
years later in a speech given in Honolulu:
Typing on his own typewriter, Dr. Dewey always wrote out his brief notes for every
lecture, a copy of which would be given to his interpreter so that he could study
them and think out the suitable Chinese words and phrases before the delivery and
the translation. After each lecture in Peking, the Dewey notes were given to the
selected recorders so that they could check their reports before publication. (Hu Shi
1962: 765)
5 Thus,  the  Dewey  lectures  as  published  in  Chinese  were  a  product  of  a  three-party
collaboration that was twice removed from the original version, that is, from Dewey’s
own typed notes and his delivery of them, through Hu’s interpretation, and, finally, to the
recorder’s  transcript.  Interestingly,  John  Dewey,  Lectures  in  China,  1919-1920 was  also  a
production of a three-party collaboration and was also twice removed from the Chinese
translation: first, Chung-ming Lu, a graduate student from Taiwan who was studying the
philosophy of education at the University of Hawaii in the early 1960s, made a literal
translation  back  into  English  of  Dewey’s  lectures  as  they  appeared  in  the  Chinese
translation;  then  Robert  Clopton  of  the  University  of  Hawaii  rendered  them  into
idiomatic English; Tsuin-chen Ou, a Dewey scholar of the New Asia College in Hong Kong,
compared  Clopton’s  version  for  fidelity  to  the  Chinese  text;  and,  finally,  Clopton
incorporated Ou’s suggestions for modifications.4 The aim was to replicate as closely as
possible Dewey’s own style and language.
6 For ease of following the analyses in this paper, I would like to define the terminology
employed to refer to the three texts available to us. Following the terminology commonly
used in translation studies, the newly-discovered Dewey’s lectures notes will be referred
to as the source text; Hu Shi’s Chinese translation of them, the target text; and Clopton
and Ou’s  translation of  Hu’s  Chinese translation back to English,  back translation.  In
analyzing Hu’s  translation and how he appropriated Dewey,  I  basically  use  the  back
translation,  as  it  is  published  and is  available  for  scholars  to  consult  and  to  verify.
However, because Clopton and Ou put a premium on recouping Dewey’s elocution, they at
times  deviated  from  the  target  text  when  they  deemed  the  latter  patently
uncharacteristic of what Dewey would have said. In the cases where the deviation was
minor, I highlight the passages in question in bold and put my own renditions also in bold
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in the brackets and indicate that they are from the target text. In the cases where Clopton
and  Ou’s  back  translation  deviated  too  much  from  the  target  text,  I  offer  my  own
translation, indicate it as such in parentheses at the end of the passage, and place it next
to Clopton and Ou’s for comparison.
7 While Clopton and Ou reported that many scholars complimented them for their success
in replicating the style and language of Dewey’s during that period,5 they sidestepped the
issue of the content. This, however, may not have been a deliberate evasion, but rather a
misplaced confidence on their part in the fidelity of Hu’s translation. In this, Clopton and
Ou were not alone. Given Hu’s superstar stature in China – Dewey’s most famous Chinese
student and modern China’s most celebrated intellectual leader – no one would be so
impertinent  as  to  suspect  that  his  understanding  of Dewey’s  ideas,  his  command of
English and, least of all, his mastery of the vernacular Chinese could be less than perfect.
To question the fidelity of his translation of Dewey’s lectures would be tantamount to
being sacrilegious.
8 Clopton  and  Ou’s  presumption  of  Hu’s  fidelity  to  Dewey’s  ideas  was  not  the  most
damaging to the value of their back translations, however. In privileging the recoupment
of how Dewey may have remarked over what he actually said and, more to the point,
what his Chinese audience and readers may have heard and read, they were completely
oblivious  of  the  role  Hu  Shi  played  in  fashioning  Dewey’s  messages  to  his  Chinese
audience, in addition to that of his competence as a translator.
9 To take up the issue of fidelity that Clopton and Ou addressed in their second round of
back translation first. The irony is that fidelity was not the top priority in Hu’s translation
philosophy. In a letter written in 1933, Hu reflected on the translation practice common
in his friends’ circle: “Twelve years ago, translation practice was quite different from
today’s.  Back  then,  literal  translation  had  not  become a  practice.  […]  We aimed for
readability and often did not stick to the original language.”6
10 Even as Hu began to accept literal translation as the practice by the 1930s, he continued
to view fidelity as a misplaced fixation. He dismissed the three golden rules of translation
made  famous  by  Yan  Fu  in  China  since  the  turn  of  the  19th-  and  20th-centuries  –
“fidelity,” “lucidity,” and “elegance” – as a false trichotomy. There was only one golden
rule in translation, he contended, which was “to carefully discern the author’s intention
and to convey it elastically in Chinese.” It was like asking oneself: “How would the author
say it in Chinese if he were Chinese?” “Lucidity equals fidelity,” snapped him with a quip:
“If  lucidity is not there,  what’s the use of fidelity? Wouldn’t it  be better to read the
original?”7
11 Hu’s  dismissal  of  fidelity  as  a  misplaced fixation reflected a  situation that  was  both
historical  and  idiosyncratic.  As  the  foremost  champion  of  vernacular  Chinese,  the
colloquial language of the common people as opposed to the classical language used by
the elite, Hu was keenly aware of the poverty of its vocabulary and the looseness of its
syntax. He lamented in a diary entry in 1922 that he could not find appropriate words in
Chinese to render such simple terms in English as “tone,” “rhythm,” and “form.”8 As late
as 1935, he contended that only by fully assimilating the precise and fine syntax of the
Western  languages,  could  vernacular  Chinese  express  complex  ideas  and  intricate
theories.9 In addition to being limited by the historical circumstances of the rudimentary
state of vernacular Chinese, Hu was further constrained by an idiosyncratic aversion to
use idioms from Classical  Chinese,  which he dismissed as  clichés,  and by an equally
idiosyncratic insistence on being plain and simple so as to be accessible to everyone.
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When he had difficulty finding appropriate vocabulary and syntax of the vernacular to
translate the sentence at hand, he would often settle for colloquialism to render the
meaning without bothering to find a syntactic structure parallel to the source text to
embed it.
12 I have analyzed elsewhere Hu’s works in translation, including his translation of Dewey’s
“Social  and  Political  Philosophy.”  I  illustrated  with  examples  how  his  translation
philosophy,  the  rudimentary  state  of  the  vernacular  Chinese,  and  his  idiosyncratic
writing style combined to make him, though fluent, masterful, and elegant in Chinese and
English respectively, a mediocre translator.10 Suffice it here to say that his translations
were marred by errors, imprecisions, emendations, elisions, and truncations. The most
egregious  examples  happened  to  be  from  his  translation  of  “Social  and  Political
Philosophy.”
13 Before we look closely at Hu’s translation of “Social and Political Philosophy,” a little bit
more information about the context of its production will be in order. The extant Dewey
lecture notes are about twelve pages in average for each of the lectures, the shortest
being Lecture XVI, which is six pages long. As these lecture notes were written in prose
form, it  is  really a misnomer to call  them lecture notes.  Granted that they were not
polished and ready for print, each lecture was fully written out, with the beginning, the
main body, and the conclusion. In Lecture II, Dewey even wrote interlinearly in one place
and on the margin in another with his fountain pen: “Will condense the above in lecture”
and “Condense with p. 6.” I suspect that these extant notes were pretty close to what he
actually spoke to his Chinese audience.
14 I have already mentioned that the translation was a three-party collaboration and that
each lecture of  this  series  lasted for  two hours.  Although the announcement  of  this
lecture series indicated that it began at 4 o’clock in the afternoon, I inferred from other
announcements of Dewey’s lecture series at Peking University that it lasted for two hours,
with one hour of time allotted for Dewey and another for his translator. With Dewey
having  provided  the  lecture  notes  before  hand,  the  translation  apparently  did  not
proceed sentence by sentence,  but  rather  paragraph by paragraph.  According to  the
reminiscences  of  the recorder,  who collaborated with Hu Shi,  for  Dewey’s  “Types  of
Thinking” lecture series:
Interpretation was done consecutively, Dewey giving about a paragraph in English,
then the interpreter turning this paragraph into Chinese. At times in the Peking
lectures Hu Shih would stop interpreting to ask Dewey for clarifıcation on some
point, then continue the Chinese version.11
15 By all accounts, Dewey was a notoriously slow speaker, who spoke haltingly and often
with long pauses between sentences. According to a Time cover story from 1928 about his
China lectures:
Dewey doctrines  are  best  not  heard from the lips  of  the  Second Confucius.  His
delivery  is  monotonous,  halting,  full  of  long  pauses  while  the  great  mind
ponderously moves careless of the impatience of auditors. But a printed page of
Dewey is starred with diadems.12
16 In lecturing, Dewey apparently stayed close to his text. Irving Edman, Dewey’s former
student and, later, colleague at Columbia, described Dewey’s classroom lecture style as
follows: “He sat at his desk, fumbling with a few crumpled yellow sheets and looking
abstractedly out of the window. He spoke very slowly in a Vermont drawl.”13 Hu Shi, too,
described Dewey’s lecture style in the same vein in his diary entry for July 6, 1921, a few
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days before the Dewey’s departure from China: “Dewey is not an eloquent speaker. When
he speaks, it looks like every word is labored. If he has a prepared text, he can give quite
forceful lectures; otherwise his lectures are quite dull.” 14
17 Thus, even though Dewey’s lecture notes for each lecture were only about twelve pages in
length and the two-hour  time allotted for  each lecture  should give  him and Hu Shi
enough time for delivery in English and translation in Chinese, I suspect Dewey did not
stray  much  from  his  prepared  notes  to  elaborate  and  digress.  There  are,  however,
significant differences between Hu’s translations and the extant Dewey’s lecture notes.
Some of these may indeed have reflected elaborations and digressions from Dewey when
delivering his lectures. I believe, nonetheless, that these differences were derived mostly
from  the  fact  that  Hu’s  translations  were  re-writes,  but  not  translations  in  the
conventional sense. As he put Dewey’s ideas in words and phrases in vernacular Chinese –
What Dewey would say if he were Chinese, as dictated by Hu’s translation philosophy – he
simplified, conflated, emended, rearranged, and even expunged Dewey’s text, along with
not infrequent translation mistakes. At the end, what he accomplished was, I submit, as
much a translation of Dewey as an appropriation of Dewey to serve his own cultural and
political agendas.
18 Space precludes  the possibility  of  presenting a  sufficient  number of  exhibits  of  Hu’s
translation samples from “Social and Political Philosophy.” Many of the errors of and lack
of precisions in his translations can be attributed to the poverty of vocabulary and syntax
of the vernacular that was being elevated into the medium for scholarly and creative
discourses, in addition to the fact that translation was not his forte. I will cite two sets of
examples to illustrate the typical ways Hu simplified, rearranged, and conflated Dewey’s
argument until he completely distorted Dewey’s ideas. The first set of examples illustrate
Hu’s tendency to simplify Dewey’s nuanced analyses of contrasts or comparisons to the
extent that they were often painted in stark black and white contrasts and impute with
good and bad connotations. In Lecture I, Dewey began by saying that human beings were
creatures of habits and customs and were averse to question them:
Men built up customs and transmitted traditions to their offspring for centuries
before they tried to discover any rationale in what they did. They made no attempts
at explanation. If asked what for one they would have said they had such and [such]
customs because they liked them, or because their ancestors told them so to act or
because their gods had established them. To question too closely was to be impious
or disloyal, and might result as with Socrates in death. (SPP: I.1)
19 Hu’s translation of this passage, with emendations, was longer:
We no longer think about what we do; we don not ask ourselves “Why do we do it
this way rather than some other way?” If someone does raise the question, we reply
that “everybody does it this way,” or that “this is the way that is has always been
done.” As long as our way of dealing with a class of situations provides reasonable
satisfaction, we do not need a theory to justify our action.
[T]here  is  a  general  tendency  to  shy  away  from  examination  and…  to  become
annoyed at or resentful  toward people who insist  upon raising the questions of
what? and how? and why? Men [“Men with high ideals” in the target text] who
have raised such questions  have often been unpopular  [“reviled” in  the  target
text],  and  some  who  have  persisted  in  pressing  their  questions  about  existing
institutions have even been put to death for their pains. The classic example, of
course, is Socrates […]. (Clopton/Ou: 46)
20 Clopton and Ou were right in taking out the prepositional phrase in the “Men with high
ideals,” for they correctly judged that Dewey would not have said that. Nevertheless, they
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could not change the fact that Hu in his target text was pitting the “men with high ideals”
against a traditionalist society. In so doing, Hu conjured up a black and white contrast
and a good versus bad contest that was not there in Dewey’s lecture notes.  Note the
contrast on the origin of philosophizing between Dewey’s original text and Hu’s target
text:
So  men  began  to  philosophize  about  their  collective  habits,  their  established
institutions  only  when  these  began  to  cease  [to]  function  satisfactorily.  The
difficulties might be internal strife or external contacts and conflicts or both. But
something threatening change or disintegration made men compare and inquire
and attempt to select and hold on to the really good. (SPP: I.2)
21 And,
It is only when existing customs and institutions cease to function adequately that
we tolerate – and even then, quite unwillingly in many cases – questioning as to
their form and function. When our laws, customs, and institutions no longer serve
the purpose for which they were originally evolved, we are forced to ask “What’s
the trouble?” or “Why aren’t they working?” [What follows in the target text is
expunged in the back translation: “‘Are there ways to remedy them?’ Thus ideas
emerge only when social institutions are not working or are diseased. Only
when society is diseased will social philosophy emerge and only when politics
is diseased will political philosophy emerge.”]. (Clopton/Ou: 47)
22 The expunged passage in bold from the target text sheds light on why Hu was enamored
with  “men  of  high  ideals.”  For  he  believed  that  society,  and  China  of  his  times  in
particular, depended on these “men of high ideals” to provide guidance to dismantle the
anachronistic and defective institutions and customs. He took to heart Dewey’s point that
“men began to philosophize about their collective habits, their established institutions
only when these began to cease [to] function satisfactorily.” He was, however, completely
oblivious of Dewey’s next point that “something threatening change or disintegration
made men compare and inquire and attempt to select and hold on to the really good.”
Thus he left out in his translation Dewey’s point on philosophy as an attempt to salvage
what was good in the tradition and replaced it with his own notion of philosophy as
reformative, as illustrated in his emendation in bold.
23 That Hu would expunge and emend as he did here in this case is understandable. He came
to Dewey late in his education in the United States, after he had studied philosophy of the
objective idealist  school  at  Cornell  for  five  years.  Following Wilhelm Windelband,  he
believed that philosophy emerged in ancient China, as it did in ancient Greece, when the
breakdown of  the  social,  political,  and intellectual  systems  prompted  the  search  for
remedies and guidance.15
24 The second example I use to illustrate the typical way Hu simplified, rearranged, and
conflated Dewey’s argument until he completely distorted Dewey’s ideas is a composite
example. In Lecture II, Dewey expounded on the rise of pragmatic philosophy under the
influence of science. Dewey first discussed the new social sciences of the 19th century and
their pretensions to discover universal laws in society as exact and inexorable as those in
physics  and  astronomy.  In  so  doing,  the  social  sciences  dismissed  philosophy  as
speculative and unverifiable. Dewey argued that whereas the social sciences had fallen
short  of  realizing  their  claims, the  spirit  of  science  and  the  scientific  method  had
contributed to the rise of pragmatic philosophy. Hu’s translation did not always follow
the steps through which Dewey made his argument. He rearranged, mismatched, and
conflated. The result was a chaotic jumble.
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25 On the relationship between the social sciences and philosophy, Hu’s translation reads as
follows:
We must bring philosophy to bear on our present situation. Science operates from a
purely objective viewpoint. It can describe and record natural phenomena, but it
cannot  guide  them  or  change  them  according  to  human  ideals.  But  social
philosophy [ “the  social  sciences” in  the  target  text]  cannot  stop  with  mere
recording  and  description;  it  must  direct  with  thoughtful  understanding  the
conclusions and recommendations which grow out of the records and descriptions
of  science.  A certain amount of  speculation is,  therefore,  necessarily  present  in
social philosophy [“the social sciences” in the target text]. On the positive side is
the tremendous change in the psychological attitude of people in general following
the development of the social sciences. We have come to regard human activities as
something  from  which  law  and  principle  can  also  be  formulated,  rather  than
something  erratic  and  unpredictable.  The  social  sciences  have  introduced  the
scientific spirit into social philosophy. Philosophy, former purely speculative, has
been brought down from the clouds to dwell among men. (Clopton/Ou: 57)
26 Hu not only erred in conflating philosophy with the social sciences, he also mistakenly
attributed philosophy’s being “brought down from the clouds to dwell among men” –
Dewey’s major theme in “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” and The Reconstruction
in Philosophy – to the social sciences. 
27 Dewey was at once more nuanced and precise. He called the new social sciences’ claim to
universality  of  their  laws based on the observations  of  certain tendencies  prevailing
under certain historical conditions absurd, “a deification of local and possibly temporary
circumstances”  (SPP:  II.3).  The social  sciences  looked askance  at  classical  philosophy
without realizing their own pretentiousness:
When the positivistic matter of fact spirit invaded the consideration of society and
politics, philosophy was condemned as speculative and pretentious, unverifiable…
The “sciences” may be called more artificial than the philosophes because the latter
were more or less frankly imaginative and speculative, telling what should be, while
the sciences claimed to give an account of things as they must be. (SPP: II.1, 3)
28 And yet, it was precisely in their frankly imaginative and speculative nature that lay the
value of philosophes, which Hu completely expunged from his translation:
The great thing about the classic systems of philosophy is that they thought with a
purpose in  view.  They were not  satisfied with mere description or  observation.
They tried to deduce principle for the directions of life, principles to be used in
judging the value of events and in projecting plans and purpose. Nothing less than
this can content man in social affairs. For we are not mere outside observers; we are
sharers, partners. Our own destiny and fortune is at stake in the course of events.
We want them to turn out one way rather than in another way, and we use our
observations of what is in order to make decisions about [what they] may and shall
be. (SPP: II.4-5)
29 In conflating the social sciences with philosophy, Hu completely missed the focal point of
Dewey in this lecture. Using the section heading, the “union of the scientific spirit with
the  moral  and  practical  aim  of  philosophy,”  Dewey  spelled  out  the  difference  that
distinguished the pragmatist philosophy from classical philosophy and, for that matter,
the social  sciences.  Of  the social  sciences,  with their  pretension to become objective
sciences – “spectator theory of  knowledge,” as  Dewey called it,  Dewey scoffed:  “It  is
absurd to suppose that we can have a coldblooded social science that eliminates desire
and preference and emotion and bias” (SPP: II.6). In contradistinction to this “spectator
theory of knowledge,” the pragmatist philosophy was “pragmatic, instrumental”:
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That is, it aims to be an art, an applied science, a form of social engineering. Politics
is an art, but [it] should not be a blind or routine or magical art, not directed by
intrigue or vested interest, etc. […] The building of railways and bridges, of canals
and electric dynamos recognizes the supremacy of human aims and desires. It uses
factual knowledge in behalf of collective human ends and purposes. But the use
depends  upon  positive  science,  and  hence  is  not  blind,  random,  accidental, or
merely traditional. It can conceive and execute new things in an orderly way that
turns the course of natural phenomena in definite channels.  In like fashion our
social  and  political  notions  and  theories  and  systems  must  be  used  for  social
constructions, for social engineering and must be subjected to the tests of such use.
(SPP: II.6-7)
30 What  this  composite  example  reveals  is  as  much  about  translation  as  about
appropriation. As appropriation is the focus for the second half of this article, I would like
to mention at this point two more issues related to translation. The first involved the
difficulty Hu faced when neologisms or technical terms required to render foreign terms
had not been coined or agreed upon. There is one good example in Lecture XII where
Dewey discussed the early 19th century British political reforms under the influence of
utilitarians. Of the three main ideas the utilitarians brought to bear on reforms, the third
one was about constitutional government. Dewey said in part: “Paradoxical as it sounds,
the lawmakers must themselves be under [the] law and act according to it” (SPP: XII.5). As
Hu  must  have  experienced  difficulty  in  finding  an  appropriate  word  to  render
“paradoxical,” he settled – aghast! – for “superficial.” It should be pointed out that Hu’s
translation of this sentence was faithfully translated back into English by Clopton/Ou,
including the wrong choice of word in question “superficial”: “Legislators are also subject
to the restrictions embodied in the law. At first glance this appears to be a superficial
point, but actually it is extremely important.” (Clopton/Ou: 145).
31 The other issue concerning translation is a personal and ideological one, which speaks
volumes about how translation is never a neutral operation. In Lecture XVI, Dewey said:
“However much men may rightly differ as to the wisdom of schemes of socialism and
communism, all wise and sympathetic persons ought to agree upon the need of the widest
possible sharing of knowledge, including news, the knowledge as to what is going on in
society, in the whole society of humanity, a communism of intelligence” (SPP: XVI.4).
Hu’s  translation  with  emendations  reads:  “Many  people  naturally  are  opposed  to
socialism in economics. Because it impinges upon private interests, opposition is to be
expected. Yet even though many people would object to the equal division of properties,
there  is  one  area  for  which  all  would  be  willing,  which  is  socialism of  knowledge.
Whereas a property becomes smaller the more it  is divided, knowledge increases the
more it  is distributed.”16 Clopton/Ou’s back translation in this case,  though not quite
faithful to Hu’s translation, is closer to Dewey’s usual practice in specifying the class
component: “We can understand why some members of the privileged classes oppose
socialism in the realm of economics – It is simply that they don’t like the idea that their
possessions will be shared with others. But the same objection does not apply to what we
might call socialism of knowledge. Where material possessions are concerned, the more
people  who share  them,  the  less  each  will  have;  but  just  the  opposite  is  true  of
knowledge.” (Clopton/Ou: 178).
32 That Hu would substitute “socialism” for “communism” had nothing to do with fear of
censorship.  China  was  then  divided,  with  regional  warlords  vying  for  power  among
themselves. They were too weak and too preoccupied with other priorities to exercise
thought control. Hu’s decision to substitute “socialism” for “communism” was purely a
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personal one. While Hu was averse to Communism throughout his life, for almost thirty
years until the early 1940s, he believed that socialism represented the latest phase of the
development of the democratic ideal.  In “The Civilizations of the East and the West”
published in Whither Mankind in 1928 edited by Charles Beard, he contended:
The  ideals  of  Socialism  are  merely  supplementary  to  the  earlier  and  more
individualistic  ideas  of  democracy.  They  are  historically  part  of  the  great
democratic movement. […] Hence the rise of the socialistic movements which, when
freed  from  their  distracting  theories  of  economic  determinism  and  class  war,
simply mean the emphasis on the necessity of making use of the collective power of
society or of the state for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.17
33 He proclaimed that “[t]he world is becoming socialistic without being aware of it.” Citing
as  evidence  the  social  legislations  enacted  in  England,  “the  mother  country  of
capitalism,” and the United States, “the champion of individual liberty,” he argued that
these great democracies had elevated the liberal ideals to the highest level akin to a
“religion of Democracy” that “not only guarantees one’s own liberty, nor merely limits
one’s liberty by respecting the liberty of other people, but endeavors to make it possible,
for every man and every woman to live a free life;  which not only succeeds through
science and machinery in greatly enhancing the happiness and comfort of the individual,
but also seeks through organization and legislation to extend the goods of life to the
greatest number.”18
34 Such effervescent celebration of utilitarian political philosophy, though coming from an
essay written ten years later, reveals only the tip of the iceberg of the problems in Hu’s
translation of “Social and Political Philosophy.” I will analyze now how Hu manipulated
and appropriated Dewey’s ideas to advance his own cultural and political agendas in the
following four areas: the utilitarian political philosophy; the modern state as the best
instrument to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number;  society as an
organicist entity; and, last but not the least, democratic realism.
35 In  the  extant  lecture  notes  on  “Social  and  Political  Philosophy,”  Dewey  referred  to
utilitarianism only once, that is, in Lecture XII, where he analyzed the utilitarian political
philosophy in the context of the development of British liberalism. Yet in Hu’s translated
version,  utilitarianism appeared in  two other  places  through his  emendations.  In  all
three, including where Dewey referred to utilitarianism both as a historical movement
and as a critique, Hu made Dewey appear to be a utilitarian. In Lecture II where Dewey
characterized the goals of pragmatic philosophy, he said, 
Politics is an art, but should not be a blind or routine or magical art, not directed by
intrigues  or  vested interest,  etc.  It  rests  on the possibility  of  introducing  more
conscious regulation to the course of events in behalf of the general or public
interests. (SPP: II.6-7)
36 It is perhaps no longer a surprise to readers of this article that Hu’s translation did not
exactly  follow  Dewey’s  text.  In  fact,  Dewey’s  references  to  “intrigues”  and  “vested
interest” were generally expunged from Hu’s translation, the reason of which will  be
analyzed below. At any rate, this particular paragraph in Hu’s translation differed quite
significantly from Dewey’s original. It may have been the result of Dewey’s impromptu
elaboration, or Hu’s rearrangement of Dewey’s lecture notes, or Hu’s emendation. The
point here,  however,  is  to compare the phrases in bold in Dewey’s original  and Hu’s
translation in Clopton/Ou’s back translation: 
It is not enough, for example, for economists merely to describe the production and
exchange of goods, and stop there; they must indicate the directions, based upon
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their study of economic situations and events, in which men are to move so that
the greatest number of people may achieve the maximum satisfaction [“the
greatest happiness of the greatest number” in the target text]. (Clopton/Ou: 59)
37 Note that Clopton and Ou did not render in their back translation the entirety of that
famous  utilitarian  dictum:  “the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number.”  They
substituted “the maximum satisfaction” for “the greatest happiness.” The reason for this
substitution is not hard to find; they knew Dewey was no utilitarian.
38 In lecture X, Dewey discoursed on the nature of the state and the use of force. Toward the
end of this lecture, he discussed one of the moral criteria for judging the state:
It  must  be  admitted  that  the  historic  state  has  been  conducted  largely  in  the
interest  of  an  exploiting  governing  few,  a  reigning  house  or  dynasty,  or  an
economic class that could use political power to further its own interests. But it
must also be admitted that political struggles for democratic government have been
waged  against  these  conditions,  and  the  political  struggle  for  democratic
government has been in the main an attempt to see that the state functioned in
behalf of the public interest – that it legislates and administers in the interest of
the people at large. (SPP: X.7-8)
39 Hu’s translation reads as follows:
To sum up what we have said, the state is judged to be good when it represents the
general public welfare [“the broadest public interest” in the target text]; but it
is not good, no matter whether it be called a democracy or something else, if it
represents  the  interests  of  a  minority  of  its  people,  or  of  a  monarch  and  his
relatives,  or  of  one  political  party,  or  of  one  economic  class.  The  fundamental
problem in politics is to build a state which consistently works for the welfare of
all  its people [“the broadest public interest of the greatest number” in the
target text]. (Clopton/Ou: 132)
40 The phrases highlighted in bold clearly indicated that this second time, Clopton and Ou
eschewed completely Hu’s  utilitarian language.  Yet  even though the back translators
could vindicate Dewey by stripping off mistaken or misleading emendations in the target
translation, they could not restore what had already been expunged in the first round of
translation if the source text is no longer extant, as had been the case of Dewey’s “Social
and Political Philosophy.”
41 This was exactly what Hu did. In Lecture XII, Dewey did not merely analyze liberalism and
the utilitarian political philosophy. He presented his critique as well. None of Dewey’s
critique of utilitarian philosophy and his larger critique of liberalism, however, appeared
in Hu’s translation. As Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism was embedded in his critique of
liberalism in general,  it is easier to reproduce both at the same time to see what Hu
expunged:
The great error in the theories of liberalism is [that] they tended to make political
organization  a  means  of  purely  individual  welfare,  the  rights  of  individuals
conceived  apart  from  the  social  ties  and  connections  through  which  alone  the
individuals  can  attain  a  full  life  (Hence  reduction  of  happiness  to  pleasures  in
utilitarianism, and emphasis upon security, upon possession). (SPP: XII.6; emphasis
in the source text)
42 And:
The error in liberalism in thinking that the state originated in the choice of isolated
individuals and aims to protect them as individuals in their rights resulted in two
other errors. The first was in thinking of government as a kind of necessary evil, a
surrender  of  some rights  and liberties  in  order  to  be  more  certain  of  others  –
especially of physical existence and property. […] The other great mistake of liberal
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philosophy was in supposing that the individual is an adequate judge of his own
interest, and this self-interest of each may be counted upon to secure a regard for
the net welfare of all. (SPP: XII.7-8)
43 What Hu left out was not simply Dewey’s discussion of the shortcomings of utilitarianism
and liberalism. He excised from his translation long paragraphs in which Dewey pointed
out  the  dangers  that  threatened  democracy  and  his  cherished  goals  for  democracy.
Toward the end of this lecture, Dewey recapitulated what he referred to as the “three
planks”  of  liberal  political  philosophy:  suffrage,  representative  legislature,  and
constitutional government. It is true that Dewey said that “they are the best devices yet
invented for keeping officials responsible to the public will.” At the same time, he insisted
that “they are not ends in themselves,” that “they have no intrinsic sacredness,” and that
“these means are not  perfect  and will  doubtless  be improved” (SPP:  XII.6-7).  On the
positive side, he cited the extension of suffrage irrespective of sex, wealth, and education
as  one  area  of  improvement.  He  even  referred  to  referendum  and  initiative  as
experiments  in  combining  the  ideas  of  representative  democracy  with  that  of  pure
democracy.  On  the  negative  side,  he  warned  of  the  danger  of  dynastic,  family,  and
business interests in subverting democracy and thereby hampering “the full use of the
government  as  a  democratic  tool.”  Then,  finally,  capping  his  lecture  was  the
quintessential Dewey: the reminder that political democracy was but part of the broader
moral and social democracy. He insisted, 
The ulterior justification of political democracy, that is[,] of popular government, is
its educative effect. That is, its effect in broadening the interests and imagination,
in extending sentiments from personal and local and family,  clique interests,  to
take in the welfare of the country, producing a public conscience and civic loyalty
and  its  effect  in  stimulating  thought,  ideas,  and  their  expression  about  social
matters. (SPP: XII.9; emphasis in the source text)
44 None of these – Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism and liberalism, dangers that threatened
democracy,  and  Dewey’s  ideal  about  democracy  as  a  moral  and  social  democracy  –
appeared in Hu’s translation. In place of them all was a Dewey who concluded this lecture
celebrating liberalism as the crowning achievement of the humankind and to admonish
his audience to count their blessings: 
These issues – general elections, direct election, terms of office, revision of election
laws – are nothing sacrosanct in themselves, but are moving in the same direction.
Many procedures are naturally the result of common sense political experiences
and are important. Considering the long and hard struggle humankind has gone
through to develop such a mechanism to make the state responsible to the people
and to abide by laws when dispensing its power, these procedures are the gems
humankind has distilled from years of political experiences! (Translation mine)19
45 Clopton and Ou obviously thought these pronouncements were so blatantly unlike Dewey
that they toned them down until they were quite innocuous, if also vacuous:
Political  liberalism poses  a  host  of  down-to-earth  problems –  general  elections,
direct election, terms of office, revision of election procedures, and many others –
and solutions to these problems vary from time to time and from place to place.
However,  treatment of  such problems is  fundamentally  based on the theory we
have  been  discussing.  Even  when  solutions  must  be sought  in  our  everyday
experience and on the basis  of  political  common sense,  they are still  important
problems. We must not allow ourselves to forget that both the concept of a state
that is response to the people and the methods by which the people may effectively
control the government are the fruit of many years of laborious struggle. Even the
everyday practicalities which we sometimes take as a matter of course represent
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the  crystalized  and  accumulated  political  experience  of  many  generations.
(Clopton/Ou: 146)
46 That Hu would excise completely from his translation Dewey’s critique of democracy and
of utilitarian political philosophy was not surprising. It is not just that democracy was a
rallying cry of the New Culture Movement, of which Hu was its foremost leader, and he
would not want to see its luster tarnished. He genuinely believed democracy embodied
the highest value of modern Western civilization, as testified by his hyperbolic phrase of
the “religion of Democracy” cited above. His faith in democracy was closely linked to his
belief that the modern state was the best instrument to promote the greatest happiness
for the greatest number.
47 It was perhaps fitting that the first time Hu publicly spelled out his belief in the modern
state was at the conference held to celebrate Dewey’s eightieth birthday in New York in
1939. While it is well known among Dewey scholars that Sidney Hook, Dewey’s “Bull Dog,”
attacked Hu on that occasion, there is no paper trace that allows them to reconstruct
what had happened. The only direct reference to it was in a letter from Dewey, who was
not present at the celebration, to Roberta Lowitz in which he said, “I hadn’t heard about S
[idney]. H[ook].’s attack on Dr. Hu – The latter sent me a copy of his remarks, & I wrote
him an appreciative letter – there was nothing to object to in his criticisms.”20 As for Hu
himself, he left only a terse note in his diary entry, “I went to the so-called ‘Conference on
Methods of Philosophy.’ […] The atmosphere was very disagreeable […] I read my short
paper, participated briefly in the discussion, and left.”21
48 Hu’s presentation was revised and published in the celebration volume under the title,
“The Political Philosophy of Instrumentalism.”22 I discovered in the Hu Shi Archives in
Beijing the transcript of his original paper, “Instrumentalism As A Political Concept,”
which offers us concrete evidence to suggest what may have prompted Hook to attack Hu.
More germane to our discussion here, this paper provides us with an argument, albeit
developed  twenty  years  afterwards,  which  was  in  germination  when  Hu  translated
Dewey’s “Social and Political Philosophy.” This latter point is not a speculation, for Hu
himself  said as much.  A year after the Dewey birthday celebration,  Hu gave another
revised  version  of  the  same  essay,  reverting  back  to  use  his  original  title,
“Instrumentalism As A Political Concept,” at the bicentennial celebration of the founding
of the University of Pennsylvania.23 After having revised the same essay three times, he
was happy with the result and noted with satisfaction in his diary,  “This has been a
subject matter that I ponder over often in the past twenty years. […] Having worked on it
three times within a year enables me to have a pretty good grip of it. It has taken shape,
having torn apart some old ideas and staked out some of my own.”24
49 Hu did not abandon his thesis in the revised version that appeared in the Dewey birthday
volume, which was strikingly similar to what he put into Dewey’s mouth at the end of
Lecture XII quoted earlier: “The state is a tool for us to use, to experiment with, to master
and control, to love and cherish – but not something to be afraid of.”25 It differed from the
original version,  in the first place,  in that it  invoked for support Dewey’s own ideas,
particularly his two essays that differentiated force, coercion, and forces written in 1916.
More interesting, however, was in what it had deleted. A few of these deleted passages
would suffice to illustrate why Hook may have found them objectionable:
All institutions are tools for definite actions and for definite ends. The judge, the
king, the law, the state, are tools invented by men for the purpose of performing
actions which cannot be effectively performed by private and separate individuals.
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The modern state  is  probably  one of  the  greatest  inventions  ever  made by  the
intelligence of men. It is the instrumentality that makes use of all instrumentalities;
it is the machine of machines.
50 And,
The state may originate as a mere Vigilante Committee for protection against horse
thieves. It  may develop into a tribal organization for common defense against a
threatening enemy tribe. It may at one time be dedicated to the establishment of
Justice  and the  securing of  the  Blessings  of  Liberty.  At  another  time it  may be
inspired  to  undertake  positive  endeavors  for  the  promotion  of  the  greatest
happiness of the greatest number.26
51 Hu had become a committed utilitarian before he returned to China in 1917. In 1921, he
coined the English term, “Euarchism” (“good-government-ism” or, literally, “good-men-
in-government-ism” in Chinese), to refer to the ideal modern state he had in mind. In a
diary entry for August that year, he gave a précis of a talk on euarchism that contained
exactly  the  same  premises  that  would  underpin  his  paper  at  Dewey’s  birthday
celebration:  Euarchism  as  political  instrumentalism;  government  being  the  biggest
invention by man as Homo faber; government as a force that, when properly organized
and directed,  could prevent waste and conflicts and lead to purposeful  actions being
executed efficiently; government so organized and directed having the greatest effect in
leading social progress; euarchism providing a criterion for evaluating the performance
of a government; euarchism providing a rationale for political participation by people as
inventors of government as a tool; and, finally, euarchism providing a justification for
mending, retooling, or even overthrowing the government when it failed to perform.27
52 I argue that the locus classicus of Hu Shi’s euarchism can be found in the passage in
Lecture  II  of  Dewey’s  “Social  and  Political  Philosophy”  quoted  above,  where  Dewey
referred to the pragmatic social philosophy as “pragmatic, instrumental, that is, it aims
to be an art, an applied science, a form of social engineering” and that politics as “an art
[…] rests on the possibility of introducing more conscious regulation into the course of
events in behalf of the general or public interests.”
53 Euarchism prevented Hu from appreciating Dewey’s analyses of the nature of the state.
He  had  no  problem  following  Dewey’s  differentiation  between  the  state  and  the
government.  He  also  appreciated  Dewey’s  reminder  that  “the  government  is  itself
composed of human beings having their own private interests, their own love of power
and gain” (SPP: XI.1). Both of these points appeared in his translation. In fact, euarchism
was his clarion call  to a few “good men” to enter government in order to transform
Beijing government that was hopelessly mired in an endless cycle of chaos, scandals, and
incompetency. 
54 Yet, Hu had difficulty seeing the state as anything but an instrument invented for the
benefit of society in general. He cared not who invented “the judge, the king, the law, and
the state.” Nor would he consider it important to raise the question as to whose interests
these inventions served. That the earlier inventions may have been crude, parochial, or
even brutal, he would readily grant. As he postulated in his paper at the Dewey birthday
celebration, if this string of inventions could result in a linear progression – from the
vigilante committee,  to tribal,  to  the founding of  the United States  with the goal  of
securing the Blessings of Liberty “to ourselves and our posterity,” and, finally, to the
modern state bending on the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number
– it would seem to more than compensate for whatever social cost and even sufferings
these  experimentations  may  have  incurred  historically.  For  the  modern  state,  “the
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greatest invention ever made by the intelligence of men,” had been perfected to deliver
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” It is thus not surprising that he did not
translate what Dewey said about the state in the past:
Historically  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  state  originated  in  violence  and
oppression, in conquest of one people by another usually, and [in] the desire of the
victorious people to hold the conquered in such subjection that they could exploit
them. It must be admitted that the historic state has been conducted largely in the
interests  of  an  exploiting  governing  few,  a  reigning  house  or  dynasty,  or  an
economic class that could use political  power to further its own interests.  (SPP:
X.7-8)
55 Nor was he interested in Dewey’s comments on how the modern state and its instrument,
the government, could be held hostage to private and corporate, as well as militaristic
and  industrial,  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  public.  The  following  paragraph  was
similarly discarded: 
This survival after the political organization has become democratic hampers the
full use of the government as a democratic tool. It fosters private disregard of the
public interest in social undertakings, economic and otherwise, the feeling that one
[’]  business,  one’s  affairs  are  his  own  private  and  exclusive  concerns,  that  any
public supervision or regulation is an impediment, interference, and encroachment
upon proper personal liberty. This attitude tends not only to weaken government,
to  render  it  incompetent,  but  also  tends  to  corruption  –  the  strong  private
organizations,  corporation  cliques,  militaristic  or  industrial,  use  governmental
power to promote their special interests at the expense of the public. (SPP: XII.7-8)
56 Hu’s belief in the state as an instrument that could be harnessed to serve the public
interest regardless of the power relations in society was closely tied to his organicist view
of society, the third of the preoccupations that underpin his appropriation of Dewey. In
February 1919, three months before Dewey’s arrival in China, Hu published “Immortality
–  My Religion” in Xin Qingnian (La  Jeunesse), the  most  celebrated journal  of  the New
Culture Movement. This was an article that Hu was so proud of that he penned an English
version and continued to lecture on it in the United States until the 1940s. The major
theme of  this  article  was  immortality,  which Hu began to  articulate  when he was  a
student  at  Columbia  University.  It  represented  his  critique  of  traditional  notions  of
immortality,  particularly  of  what  Hu  viewed  as  an  obsession  in  Christendom:  the
immortality of the soul. None of the traditional notions of immortality was sufficient to
serve  as  guiding principles  of  life.  In  their  places,  Hu proposed the  notion of  social
immortality. The individual, the “Lesser Self,” has a finite life span, but will leave his
legacy, positive as well as negative, on society, the “Greater Self” or the “Social Whole,”
and thus achieve immortality. He summed up this guiding principle of life in the form of
an imperative: “[T]o act in order that I may not disgrace the great social past, that I may
contribute my humble best to the great social present, and that I may not do injustice or
injury to the great social future.”28
57 There are two paragraphs in the original version of “Immortality – My Religion” where
Hu  waxed  lyrical  about  organicism  that  most  readers  will  not  know  they  existed.
Chastened by a critic’s remark, Hu left them out completely from the English version and
yet,  most  revealingly,  only  perfunctorily  edited  out  of  the  Chinese  version that  was
eventually included in his Complete Works. He removed the first paragraph that was an all-
out celebration of society as an organism and replaced or softened the offensive word in
question in the second paragraph and yet keeping the organicist argument intact:
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Society is like an organism. An organism can live only when each of its components
performs the function assigned to it and when all these special functions coalesce.
If a component becomes detached, that part of the organism would suffer or would
at least become severely impaired. The prime example is the human body. We live
because of the various functions the different parts of our body perform together.
None of these functions can operate independently, except when the whole body is
intact. Take away these special functions, the whole will cease to exist. Conversely,
when the whole disappears, so are these various functions. This is organism.
The life  of  society is  an organism [“like that of an organism” in  the revised
version],  whether  viewed  cross-sectionally  or  longitudinally.  Looking  at  society
longitudinally, the history of society is organistic. Our predecessors left imprints on
us and we, in turn, on our descendants. […] From the cross-sectional view, the life
of society is also organistic [“interpenetrated” in the revised version]. Individuals
make up society and society molds individuals. Social life depends on the division of
labor among the individuals. Likewise, no matter how different individual lives are,
no individuals can live without being influenced by society. A particular kind of
society  produces  a  particular  kind  of  individuals;  and  a  particular  kind  of
individuals make up a particular kind of society.29
58 Hu believed that society had to be viewed as a whole. There exists in society inequalities
in the distribution of  wealth,  power,  and intelligence,  to be sure.  But what look like
inequalities at the individual level are nothing but nature’s way of fitting individuals to
tasks suitable for them that  resulted in the division of  labor,  which is  necessary for
society to function. Hu was by no means callous. Ever since his student days in the United
States,  he  had come to  believe  that  nature  and humanity  were  locked into  a  bitter
struggle and that the level of a civilization was to be measured according to its ability to
bring humanity triumphant over nature. An ardent admirer of Thomas Huxley, Hu was
familiar with the former’s analysis of the eternal struggle between the “cosmic process”
and the “ethical process.” It should be pointed out that Hu most likely had never read
Dewey’s 1897 essay, “Evolution and Ethics,” in which Dewey took Huxley to task for a
false dichotomy between the two processes and for failing to see that “man is an organ of
the cosmic process in effecting its own progress,” which “consists essentially in making
over a part of the environment by relating it more intimately to the environment as a
whole; not, once more, in man setting himself against that environment.”30
59 At any rate, while Hu could invoke social legislation as the “ethical process” to address
inequalities in society, his organicism left no room for accommodating social conflicts.
From organicist viewpoint, social conflicts were anomalies and had to be resolved for
society  to  return to  normalcy.  Note  how Hu manipulated Dewey’s  analyses  of  social
conflicts. In Lecture III, Dewey made a number of observations as he proceeded to analyze
social conflicts: 
Theory began in disturbance, confusion, friction. It attempts to discover causes and
project plans of reorganization that bring about unity, harmony, freer movement.
(SPP: III.1)
60 And,
In dealing then on the basis of theory with any particular social condition we need
first to ask what pattern of human association tends to be central and regulative;
what  are  the  one-sidednesses  and  arrests,  fixation  [and]  rigidities  thereby
produced;  where  are  the  suppressions  from  which  society  is  suffering  in
consequence; what are the points of conflict, strife, antagonism of interest. (SPP:
III.8)
61 And, finally, toward the end of this lecture:
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That the unequal  and unbalanced development of  forms of  life  is  the source of
social difficulties in general and that the problem of theory is to detect these causes
in detail and provide plans for remedial action thus appears. (SPP: III.11)
62 As usual, Hu’s translation here did not follow Dewey verbatim. The closest I can find is a
long paragraph that combined these quotes and read like a summation toward the end of
this translated lecture:
The time has come, however, when we can no longer afford to wait for our society
to become disjointed and then seek means of putting it back together again; we
must  rather  devise  methods  and  instruments  to  forestall  disaster,  to  prevent
infection rather than waiting to try to cure it when it occur. We need to observe,
first of all, the causes of social conflict, to find out what groups have become too
dominating  and  have  come  to  exercise  disproportionate  power,  as  well  as  to
identify the groups that have been oppressed, denied privilege and opportunity.
Only by making such an accurate diagnosis can we hope to prevent social infection
and build a healthier society. We must devise means for bringing the interests of all
the groups of a society into adjustment, providing all of them with [“equal” in the
target text] opportunity to develop [“and to advance” in the target text], so that
each can help the others instead of being in conflict with them. We must teach
ourselves one inescapable fact: any real advantage of one group is shared by all
groups; and when one group suffers disadvantage, all are hurt. Social groups
are so intimately interrelated that what happens to one of them ultimately
affects the well-being of all of them [“When one group benefits, all groups will
benefit;  and when one group suffers,  all  will  suffer.  This  is  because social
relations are interlocked.” in the target text]. (Clopton/Ou: 71)
63 Note the contrast between Clopton and Ou’s back translation and mine that I highlight in
bold. Clopton and Ou’s back translation in this particular case tried to restore what Dewey
may have  said.  But  in  so  doing,  they  obscured the  fact  that  this  was  Hu the  social
organicist  who was  speaking,  but  not  Dewey.  Dewey had no illusion about  all  social
groups in society having “equal opportunity to develop and to advance.” In fact, Dewey
stated  in  this  lecture  that  such  vision  was  utopian  and  counterfactual,  which,  not
surprisingly, did not appear in Hu’s translation: 
We can frame in imagination a picture in which there is  a  proportionate equal
development of all these forms of associated life, where they interact freely with
one another,  and where the results  of  each one contribute  to  the richness  and
significance of every other, where family relations assist equally the cooperation of
men in science, art, religion and public life, where association for production and
sale of goods enriches not merely materially but morally and intellectually all forms
and modes of human intercourse – where in short there is mutual stimulation and
support and free passage of significant results from one to another. Such an ideal
picture is of use only because it helps us paint by contrast the state of things which
has actually brought about social divisions and conflict. (SPP: III.3)
64 Nor would Dewey suppose that “when one group benefits, all groups will benefit; and
when  one  group  suffers,  all  will  suffer.”  In  concluding  his  Lecture  IV,  Dewey
characterized the pragmatist as reformer: 
The innovator has a case to prove. He is the propounder of a hypothesis that the
welfare of society would be promoted by the adoption of a certain change, that if
this harms a special class for a time, this loss to the class is in the interests of the
community of the whole, and is the measure of justice to some other class now
suffering from inadequate social recognition. He does not present himself as a mere
rebel, hostile to the authority as such, willing to tear down recklessly in a blind
hope something better may appear. His claim that certain defects exist, and that
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they may be remedied by the adoption of certain proposed measures of change are
propositions to be examined in the light of facts. (SPP: IV.13)
65 Hu translated this paragraph as follows:
The function of reformers then becomes that of advancing diagnoses of social ills
and of formulating and propounding suggestions for changes which will improve
the situation; and, given the theory we have advanced, they can then join forces
with other elements of society in assessing the accuracy of their diagnoses, and the
probable efficacy of their proposed remedies. (Clopton/Ou: 80-1)
66 While Clopton and Ou’s back translation here, as is elsewhere, is not literal, the important
point here is that it accurately reflected what Hu had left out in his translation, that is,
class interests are not mutually compatible, which is a far cry from Hu’s belief that “when
one group benefits, all groups will benefit; and when one group suffers, all will suffer.”
67 Not only was Hu oblivious to group and class interests, but he was also convinced that one
day would come when society  would transcend group and class  interests  to  become
unified in thinking. In Lecture XVI, Dewey began by discussing free speech and attempts,
whether by the government or by special class, at controlling and manipulating public
opinion. He averred:
Private,  local  and  class  interest  will  govern  men[’]s  actions  until  through  the
communication  of  knowledge  the  whole  society,  nay,  the  whole  of  humanity,
becomes spiritually one.
Common or like thoughts cannot in the present stage of the world be secured either
by suppression or by direct inculcation, by trying to stamp one set of ideas on alike.
Divergence of opinions is necessary for progress, and the only real unity is that
which  comes  by  exchange,  based  on  toleration.  Intellectual  freedom  is  a  true
calculation of  social  life.  In it  individuality  gets  its  best  expression.  Only where
there is intellectual freedom can communication, the give and take of thought and
feeling be full and varied. (SPP: XVI.4-5)
68 What follows are two versions of back translation of Hu’s translation:
It would be a splendid thing that the people of a nation would think and believe
alike. But in this time of change, such unity can only be a goal in the future through
gradual development and could not be achieved by force. Why is it that this goal
can only  be  achieved through gradual  development?  Just  let  everyone expound
freely his/her ideas and let those that are not satisfactory be eliminated one by one
in the process, unity of ideas will eventually be achieved. (Translation mine)
Ideally, of course, it is a good thing to have the people of a nation thinking about
the same problems and moving in the direction of agreement.  But – and this is
especially true of a time like the present – this sort of consensus can be achieved
only through gradual development, as the result of free discussion and evaluation
of conflicting ideas and claims; it can never be achieved by force. The reason this is
true is that free discussion brings to light the irrelevance, the inconsistency, or the
contrariety of ideas that are inimical to the development of associated living, and
thus serves to eliminate these ideas through the action of human reason instead of
by governmental suppression. True unification is the result of free communication
and interaction, never of force. (Clopton/Ou: 178)
69 Whether  we  follow  my  back  translation  or  Clopton  and  Ou’s,  which  attempted  to
approximate what Dewey might have said without the benefit of seeing the original, it is
clear  that  something at  once  nuanced and precise  was  lost  when crucial  words  and
phrases were left out of the translation. Banished from view for the Chinese readers were
Dewey’s  insistence  on  how  “individuality  gets  its  best expression”  in  a  social  life
characterized by free communication and exchange, on thought and feeling be “full and
varied,”  and  that  “[d]ivergence  of  opinions  is  necessary  for  progress.”  What  gets
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foregrounded in Hu’s translation was a millenarian future when people would “think and
believe alike.”
70 A case can be made that Hu’s social organicism had its roots in the Chinese tradition. That
society  is  an  arena  where  different  classes  and  groups  compete  for  ascendancy  or
advantage is an anathema to traditional Chinese. What interest groups and class interests
conjured up was a specter of  people forming cliques for selfish purposes,  which was
condemned by  traditional  Chinese  political  philosophy.  In  the  Chinese  tradition,  the
“public” and the “private” were two antithetical concepts, with the former connoting
“openness” and “fairness” and the latter “concealment” and “unseemliness.” Only by
“sublimating the ‘private’ into the ‘public’,” – “huasi weigong” as the traditional saying
goes – could the “private” have a redeeming value. Hu’s social organicism complemented
well this traditional ideal of “sublimating the ‘private’ into the ‘public’” in that it enabled
him to envision a society in which all members would follow their callings – a natural
division of labor – without being riven by class or group interests.
71 This brings us to the fourth and final point of this paper, that is, how Hu’s democratic
realism shaped his interpretation of Dewey’s notion of democracy. There is no doubt that
Hu was in complete agreement with Dewey about democracy and the role of education in
fostering democracy in society. Dewey went further, however. For Dewey, democracy was
not merely a political concept, but rather a moral and social ideal. As early as 1888 when
he was teaching at  the University of  Michigan,  Dewey had already enunciated in no
equivocal terms his democratic ideal:
To say that democracy is only a form of government is like saying that home is a
more or less geometrical arrangement of bricks and mortar; that the church is a
building with pews, pulpit and spire. It is true; they certainly are so much. But it is
false; they are so infinitely more. Democracy, like any other polity, has been finely
termed the memory of an historic past, the consciousness of a living present, the
ideal  of  the coming future.  Democracy,  in a word,  is  a  social,  that is  to say,  an
ethical  conception,  and upon its  ethical  significance  is  based  its  significance  as
governmental.  Democracy is  a  form of government only because it  is  a  form of
moral and spiritual association.31
72 Not only was democracy a moral and social ideal, it was also an ideal that had to begin
and end with the individual:
It admits that the full significance of personality can be learned by the individual
only as it is already presented to him in objective form in society; it admits that the
chief  stimuli  and  encouragements  to  the  realization  of  personality  come  from
society; but it holds, none the less, to the fact that personality cannot be procured
for  any  one,  however  degraded and feeble,  by  any  one else,  however  wise  and
strong. It holds that the spirit of personality indwells in every individual and that
the choice to develop it must proceed from that individual.32
73 As a democratic realist, this was where Hu parted with Dewey. Hu cherished his public
image as  a  staunch champion for  democracy.  He  talked about  democracy  often,  but
mostly in general terms, never in the sustained and systematic manner as Dewey did. On
a few occasions, however, he did let slip his frank assessment of the general public. In
1926 when he went to Europe by traveling on the trans-Siberian railway through Moscow,
he was greatly impressed by what the Soviets were able to achieve through economic
planning. Until the early 1940s, he continued to extol the New Deal in the United States
and  the  Soviet  Five-Year  Plans  as  representing  the  two  alternative  approaches  to
increasing the productive forces in society. His enthusiasm about the Soviet experiment
caused consternation among many of his friends, who thought he was deceived by the
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Soviet  propaganda.  In  a  vigorous defense  of  his  position,  he  made  a  comment  that
revealed what he thought of the public:
Whether it is under communistic or private property system, men with talent will
always  endeavor  to  improve  themselves.  […]  As  for  the  great  majority  of  the
common people,  their unwillingness to improve, exert,  and better themselves is
such that even “riches and power can’t entice them” or, conversely, “threats and
force can’t subdue them” [a flippant use of two of the triplet stock phrases usually
reserved  for  the  vaunted  Confucian  gentleman]!  What  difference  does  it  make
whether they live under the system of private property or Communism? 33
74 Hu’s  democratic  realism  differed  fundamentally  from Dewey’s  uncompromising
conviction  that  democracy  was  a  moral  and  social  ideal  in  which  every  individual,
“however degraded and feeble,” should take charge to work out his or her individual
development. Hu’s interest was in political democracy, pure and simple. Not surprisingly,
he  did  not  feel  the  need to  translate  any of  what  he  may have  considered Dewey’s
pontifications on superfluous fine points. One case in point was in Lecture XVI where the
entire paragraph was left out of the translation: 
Freedom of speech is precious, but it is not an end, only a means. To be able to put
thought into operation in what we do and to find that what we do contributes to our
life of thought and satisfactory sentiment and not merely to material products is
the important thing. This ideal is manifested in the work of an artist and scientific
man. The painter, the laboratory worker, is free to act upon his interest, to embody
his thought. His limitations are due only to his ignorance, and lack of skill. Also
what he does brings a return wave of thought and emotion back to him. He learns
and gains intellectual skill through what he does. The tangible, material product is
secondary to this intellectual enlargement and emotional enrichment. This basic
problem of industrial society is to establish conditions that will place all men in
their labor on the plane which the small class of scientists and artists now occupy.
Then there will be a real consummation of social life in full freedom. There will [be]
a true social democracy. (SPP: XVI.5-6; emphasis in the source text)
75 Even Dewey’s summation in this culminating lecture did not escape Hu’s act of deletion
and attenuation:
Every individual  is  a  centre  of  conscious  life,  of  happiness  and  suffering,  of
imagination and thought. This is the final principle upon which democracy rests.
But this conscious life cannot be developed or realized except in association with
others, interchange, flexible intercommunication. The relations of friends illustrates
the meaning of this. If on the personal side, democracy means that all should have
the opportunity for mental realization which artists and scientific men have, it also
means that they shall be in the relations of free unobstructed intercourse with one
another that friends are. Political democracy provides the machinery, the form of
this intercourse; it makes it possible. Education, companionship, the breaking down
of class and family walls and barriers make it actual. (SPP: XVI.6; emphasis in the
source text)
76 What a beautiful vision it was, “[D]emocracy means that all should have the opportunity
for mental realization which artists and scientific men have!” But Alas! Look at what an
impoverished version the Chinese readers were given:
The fundamental idea of democracy rests on a profound belief in education in that
the majority of the common people are educable: the ignoramuses can be made
knowledgeable and the unskilled can be taught crafts. Democracy means education,
continuing  education.  After  the  individuals  leave  school,  they  will  work  in  a
democratic society where they will receive training no matter what they do, as if
they were still  in school.  In this  way,  individual  ideas will  extend to the entire
society and, eventually, the entire world. The day education achieves its goal will be
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the day when the whole world reaches consensus on the common interests of the
humankind. When that day arrives, it will not just be one society or one nation that
reaps the benefit. (Translation mine)
Education is basic to democracy, because democracy, by definition, is based on the
conviction that most people have the capacity to be educated, and that they are
capable of learning. In fact, democracy means education; it is, itself, a process of
continuing education of all the people. A democratic society provides schooling, but
it  also  calls  for  those  who  have  had  the  privilege  of  schooling  to  dedicate
themselves to public service, and at the same time, to continue learning as they did
while in school. Each person is called upon to make his contribution to his own
society, and ultimately to the whole of humanity. If we had effective education, we
would have a world in which each person would recognize that his own welfare is
intimately interrelated with that of his fellow men. The entire world would benefit
from this sort of education, not just one nation or a single society. (Clopton/Ou:
180)
77 We can see how Clopton and Ou tried very hard to salvage Hu’s translation to make it
passably look like what Dewey might have said. Now, with Dewey’s lecture notes, we can
see how little Hu’s translation of this paragraph resembled what Dewey actually said.
78 The  significance  of  these  newly-discovered  Dewey  “Social  and  Political  Philosophy”
lecture notes cannot be overestimated. These lectures notes enable us to check them
against  Hu’s  translation  and  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  messages  the  Chinese
readers received differed significantly from what Dewey intended to impart to them. Any
future research on Dewey’s lectures in China will have to use these lecture notes, albeit
incomplete, rather than Clopton and Ou’s back translation. 
79 Roberto  Frega’s  “John  Dewey’s  Social  Philosophy:  A  Restatement”  in  this  issue  is  a
salutary case in point. He compares Clopton and Ou’s back translation of Lectures III and
IV with the corresponding lectures in Dewey’s original and finds significant divergences
between the two. He cites one particular passage in which Dewey discussed the conflicts
within the Chinese family to demonstrate how the back translation has distorted Dewey’s
original ideas, viz., whereas “equality” that was not there in Dewey’s original text was
foregrounded in the back translation, Dewey’s focal point on groups as embodying basic
interests was totally lost. This was a typical case of emendations and elisions typical of
Hu’s translation strategy, driven by his New Culture Movement agenda to challenge the
traditional Chinese family structure.
80 The pitfall of using back translation based on seriously flawed target translation is well
illustrated by the recent  study by Scott  Stroud of  Dewey’s  visit  to China.34 Stroud is
perhaps the first scholar to have made use of these newly-discovered lecture notes to
analyze Dewey’s lectures in China. His otherwise sensitive analysis of Dewey’s rhetorical
activities  is  marred,  however,  by an indiscriminate use of  Dewey’s  lecture notes and
Clopton and Ou’s  back translation,  as  if  the two were interchangeable.  For  instance,
instead of using Dewey’s own Lecture XVI notes in which he expounded eloquently on
democracy as a moral and social ideal, Stroud used the greatly impoverished version in
Clopton  and  Ou.  Then  reading  it  teleologically  against  the  eventual  triumph  of
Communism  in  China,  he  reached  the  mistaken  conclusion  that  Dewey  was  using
intellectual  freedom and  toleration  of  dissent  to  exhort  the  increasingly  radicalized
Chinese students to engage in political reform through discussion and persuasion, but not
violence or coercion. More erroneous, Stroud went on to contend that Dewey adapted the
content and form of his message to address his Chinese audience. As a percipient rhetor,
it was only natural that Dewey would in his lectures to the Chinese audience use Chinese
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philosophers and tradition as reference points to explicate Western social and political
philosophy. These are familiar rhetorical tactics, which do not affect the content itself.
What these extant Dewey lecture notes elucidated were exactly the same major themes
that he expounded in Reconstruction in Philosophy, which he had delivered a few months
earlier at the Imperial University of Tokyo. Dewey did not adapt the content or the form
of his message because he was addressing the Chinese.
81 To sum up, these extant Dewey’s lecture notes on “Social and Political Philosophy” enable
us, first of all, to appreciate the difficulties early 20th century Chinese encountered when
they first  attempted to  translate  foreign works using vernacular  Chinese,  which had
never  been a  medium for  scholarly  or  academic  discourse  before.  The  many errors,
together with the lack of precision and loss of nuance, which vitiate Hu’s translation of
Dewey, have to be considered in this larger context. More important, no translators are
neutral or transparent conduits that decode ideas from one language to another. And
when that translator happened to be the most celebrated intellectual leader of modern
China, he was poised to stamp his imprint unequivocally on the translation. He tweaked,
rearranged, and even expunged at will the source text. He was translating Dewey, to be
sure. But it would be more accurate to say that he was using Dewey to advance his own
cultural and political agenda.
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ABSTRACTS
The significance of the discovery of half of Dewey’s most important China lecture series notes,
“Social and Political Philosophy,” cannot be overestimated. These newly-discovered lecture notes
provide us with a unique opportunity to conduct a translation case study in both directions: first,
to check Hu Shi’s translation against Dewey’s lecture notes; and second, to check John Dewey:
Lectures in China,  1919-1920, “back translations” in the terminology of translation studies, both
against Hu’s translation and against Dewey’s original notes that the back translators tried to
reconstruct. More important, by treating translations as re-writes and as products of cultural
and ideological manipulations, this case study enables us to analyze how Hu Shi appropriated
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